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A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS: FREE SPEECH AND PAYING 





In October 2016, the city of Springfield, Illinois encroached on the 
First Amendment rights of its citizens and hardly anyone noticed. The City 
Council approved an ordinance that significantly limits the rights of citizens 
to pay debts owed to the city with coins.1
 
Specifically, the new law provides 
that “[c]ash payments [to the City] may be limited to no more than $20 in 
coinage of which not more than $5 may be in pennies. Overpayments will 
be applied to any existing debt if applicable.”2 
Municipalities may be inconvenienced when citizens use coins to pay 
their fines or taxes, but legislation to prevent citizens from doing so runs 
afoul of the U.S. Constitution. This essay is a reminder of how easily First 
Amendment rights can be forgotten. 
II. FREE SPEECH AND PROTEST 
One of the rights American citizens hold most dear is the right to 
freedom of speech. Since the Bill of Rights was ratified, individuals in our 
country have shared ideas, made statements, and engaged in protests with 
the knowledge that the government could not infringe upon their right to say 
what they want.3 Of course, over time, modest restrictions have been placed 
on the right to speak out as one may desire,4 but the fundamental protection 
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 1. See New law in Springfield bans paying fines with too many coins, 
QCONLINE.COM (Oct. 20, 2016, 4:35 PM), https://qconline.com/news/illinois/new-law-in-
springfield-bans-paying-fines-with-too-many/article_b3e6c990-962d-11e6-87d4-
b32d7d8ac51d.html. 
 2. SPRINGFIELD, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 37, art. II, § 37.19 (2016). 
 3. See, e.g., Emma Hansen, The Bill of Rights and Me, 28-JUN VT. B.J. 71 (2002); 
Mary C. Ambacher, Note, Bare-Naked Ladies (And Gentlemen): Analyzing Protection of 
Nude Protesting under the First Amendment and State Constitutions, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
331 (2014). 
 4. “Speech is often provocative and challenging . . . [but it] is nevertheless protected 
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger 
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afforded by the First Amendment remains sacrosanct: “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”5 
There are also a few instances where the government may restrict 
speech, but those circumstances are few and far between as well. For 
example, the government, as an employer, may discipline a government 
employee for speech made within the scope of public employment.6 
Likewise, when the government acts as a K-12 educator, student speech may 
be restricted.7 The government may regulate the speech of inmates if the 
government is the controller of prisons,8 and the government may also 
regulate the speech of members of the military9 and members of the bar.10 
Limitations on free speech are abhorred even if the “speech” is 
nonverbal.11 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in Citizens United v. 
FEC, reaffirmed that the expenditure of money—in the form of campaign 
ads—is protected speech.12 Moreover, within the Citizens United opinion, 
the Court quoted from Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissent in an earlier First-
Amendment case to underscore its point: 
 
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.” 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 
(1927) (“To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that 
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced . . . [,] to believe that the danger 
apprehended is imminent . . . [, and] to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious 
one.”), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also Barboza v. 
D’Agata, 151 F. Supp. 3d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). But see, e.g., Harper & Row v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (restrictions on speech because of intellectual property rights); 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography is not protected speech); 
Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words may not be protected). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3. 
 6. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 7. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 8. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
 9. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
 10. EUGENE VOLOKH, FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: 
PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 476 (3d ed. 2008). 
 11. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (attaching a peace sign to a 
U.S. flag is protected speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
505 (1969) (wearing black armbands to school is “closely akin to pure speech”); United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (reinstating the conviction of a defendant who burned 
his draft card and claimed that the law prohibiting such conduct violated his First 
Amendment right to free speech); Ronnie Schreiber, Driver Sues Cops After Being Arrested 
for Insulting Language On Ticket Payment Form, THE TRUTH ABOUT CARS (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2013/06/driver-sues-cops-after-being-arrested-for-
insulting- language-on-ticket-payment-form/ (People v. Barbosa (Town of Fallsburg Justice 
Court), “Decision” of Justice Ivan Kalter, March 22, 2013, concerning a defendant who 
signed a traffic payment correspondence with the words “FUCK YOUR SHITTY TOWN 
BITCHES” written across the top and was charged with Aggravated Harassment, but the 
judge dismissed the charges as protected speech). 
 12. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to 
create in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free to use 
new forms, and new forums, for the expression of ideas. The civic 
discourse belongs to the people, and the Government may not prescribe 
the means used to conduct it.
13
 
Likewise, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated: 
Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject 
to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have often noted 
that restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that 




Whether an activity is constitutionally-protected “speech” requires “an 
analysis of whether the ‘speech is of public or private concern, as 
determined by all the circumstances of the case,’ including whether the 
challenged activities take place in a traditional public forum.”15 At the heart 
of the First Amendment’s protection is speech that deals with “matters of 
public concern,” which means speech that can be reasonably considered as 
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community.16 When a citizen pays a fine or a tax to a municipality and uses 
coins, case law and news accounts suggest that the action is an act of 
protest; the citizen is clearly addressing a matter of “political concern” to the 
community in his or her own individual way.17 As a form of protest, political 
protests should be permitted “unless shown likely to produce a clear and 
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”18 
Protests, like the type the City of Springfield seeks to end with its 
ordinance, do occur in other cities and do not face significant opposition 
 
 13. Id. at 372, (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 341 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting)). 
 14. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 15. City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 167 N.H. 731, 739, 118 A.3d 253, 259 (2015) (quoting 
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011)). The Snyder Court continued its analysis by 
explaining, “[S]peech on matters of public concern . . . is at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection. . . . That is because ‘speech concerning public affairs is more than 
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.’” 562 U.S. at 451–52 (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75). 
 16. Cleaveland, 167 N.H. at 739, 118 A.3d at 259. 
 17. See e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–50 (1983) (describing what 
constitutes speech that touches on a public concern). 
 18. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
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from the government. In Frisco, Texas, a citizen contested a ticket he 
received for going nine miles over the posted speed limit.19 He lost his 
challenge and was fined $212, which he paid with pennies.20 As icing on the 
cake, the man painted on the buckets that he used to carry the pennies the 
words “Extortion Payment.”21 The Frisco Municipal Court accepted the 
payment, but staffers were required to expend approximately three hours to 
count the coins.22 In Lebanon, Virginia, a man paid $2,978.14 in vehicle 
taxes to the Department of Motor Vehicles with 298,745 pennies, which 
weighed 1,548 pounds; the coins were delivered in five wheelbarrows.23 The 
Department’s employees needed nearly twenty-four hours to count the 
change by hand.24 
The ability to pay governmental agencies using U.S. currency is 
covered by the Coinage Act of 1965.25 The law provides that “United States 
coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of 
Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, 
public charges, taxes, and dues.”26 The U.S. Treasury Department website 
explains: “This statute means that all United States money as identified 
above are [sic] a valid and legal offer of payment for debts when tendered to 
a creditor.”27 Municipalities should accept the payment of fines in coins, 
primarily because U.S. coins are legal tender.28 There is no provision in the 
statute that permits government agencies (federal, state, or local) to reject 
payments made with coins;
 29 however, that is exactly what the City of 
Springfield has done.30 
The First Amendment does not end at the city treasurer’s door just 
because the refusal to accept coins as payment for fines is intended “to stop 
stuff that’s unnecessary.”31 To pay a fine with coins is one of the few legal 
 
 19. Tony Marco, Texas Man Pays $212 Traffic Ticket in Pennies, CNN (Mar. 7, 2017, 
1:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/31/us/traffic-ticket-paid-with-buckets-of-pennies-
trnd. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Elyse Wanshel, Man Paid DMV with 298,745 Pennies in Pettiest Revenge Scheme 
Ever, HUFFPOST (Aug. 15, 2017, 1:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/man-pays-
dmv- pennies_us_5879101ce4b0e58057fe80d7. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2016). 
 26. Id. 
 27. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, RESOURCE CENTER: LEGAL TENDER STATUS (Jan. 4, 
2011, 4:47 PM), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Currency/Pages/legal-tender. 
aspx. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See supra note 25. 
 30. See supra note 2. 
 31. QCONLINE.COM, supra note 1. 
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ways one can express dissatisfaction with the underlying law that gave rise 
to the fine or protest a process that the fine-payer may deem unfair. Any 
other method of protest is very likely to be deemed as unacceptable in our 
society and could lead to additional fines or worse.32 More importantly, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized “that a principal ‘function of 
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may 
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to 
anger.’”33 
In Keene v. Cleaveland, the City of Keene, New Hampshire filed suit 
against parking- meter-enforcement protestors for tortious interference with 
contractual relations, negligence, and civil conspiracy, and requested 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief; all claims were dismissed by 
the trial court.34 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed and 
remanded the dismissal of the equity claims, but upheld the dismissal of the 
other claims.35 In ruling in favor of the protestors, the court concurred with 
their argument that “‘absent acts of significant violence,’ the First 
Amendment protects their non-verbal acts from tort liability.”36 
In State v. Carroll, the Court of Appeals of Ohio was asked to review a 
finding that a defendant was in contempt of court for attempting to pay a 
fine with unrolled pennies, in part, because the court clerk refused to accept 
unwrapped coins.37 The defendant asserted that his goal was not to mock the 
judicial process, but rather, “I thought it was my American right to pay with 
American currency in legal tender, and, secondly, in protest to the verdict of 
 
 32. See, e.g., Castano v. Gabriel, 60 Misc. 2d 218, 302 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1969) (“The naked assertion of ‘under protest’ does not imply or establish that the act 
performed was under any compulsion. It is merely an assertion that what is being done is 
contrary to the desire or intent of the protesting party . . . .” (citing Matthews v. William 
Frank Brewing Co., 26 Misc. 46, 55 N.Y.S. 241 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1899))). See also Emma 
Stefansky, James Cromwell Sentenced to Jail for Refusing to Pay an Environmental Protest 
Fine, VANITY FAIR (July 2, 2017, 12:07 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/Hollywood 
/2017/07/james-cromwell-jail-time-protest-fine (actor jailed for refusing to pay a fine); Mark 
Molloy, Mayor Who Tried to Pay $4K Fine with 360,000 Coins Sued by Ethics Committee, 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:13 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/northamerica/usa/12007752/Mayor-who-tried-to-pay-4k-fine-with-360000-coins-
sued-by-ethics-committee.html (mayor, who knew that ethics commission accepted only 
checks, delivered coins as payment for a fine imposed by the commission and had his fine 
doubled as a result of his unethical behavior). 
 33. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408–09 (1989) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). 
 34. 167 N.H. at 733, 118 A.3d at 255. 
 35. Id. at 744, 118 A.3d at 263. 
 36. Id. at 740, 118 A.3d at 260. 
 37. State v. Carroll, No. 96CA2236, 1997 WL 118064, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13, 
1997). 
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the trial and the way that it went.”38 The lower court not only found the 
defendant in contempt for failing to pay the original fine, but also for 
attempting to obstruct the duties of the clerk, and sentenced the defendant to 
130 hours imprisonment in the county jail.39 The Court of Appeals of Ohio 
set aside the contempt order, but held that the clerk was reasonable to 
require loose coins to be wrapped and therefore was not required to accept 
loose coins.40 Interestingly, the court did not rule that the clerk’s refusal to 
accept coins was acceptable; the court simply stated that the clerk’s 
requirement that loose coins be wrapped was reasonable.41 
It is hard to concoct a credible argument to support the absolute refusal 
to accept coins as payment of a fine. Indeed, the City of Springfield’s 
Treasurer told reporters that the new ordinance’s wording is “flexible” to 
accommodate a citizen whose only method of payment is with coins.42 
However, the language of the ordinance does not provide a clear exception. 
It reads, “Cash payments may be limited to no more than $20 in coinage of 
which not more than $5 may be in pennies. Overpayments will be applied to 
any existing debt if applicable.”43 The word “may” in the ordinance might 
be sufficient to persuade the Treasurer that the ordinance may be flexibly 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at *4. However, one judge wrote a concurring opinion and issued a stinging 
rebuke to the defendant: 
I concur in both the judgment and the opinion. I write separately to emphasize 
that appellant’s actions in this case have resulted in an inexcusable waste of time 
and judicial resources. 
Appellant seeks to voice his displeasure with his disorderly conduct conviction. 
Appellant stated that his purpose in tendering the pennies for satisfaction of the 
fine and court costs was “in protest to the verdict of the trial and the way it went. 
I thought I was not given a fair trial.” 
Obviously, appellant is displeased with his conviction for disorderly conduct. I 
fully recognize and understand that many litigants are displeased and frustrated 
with the outcome of cases in which they are involved. Appellant’s remedy, 
however, as pointed out to him by the trial court judge, was to appeal the trial 
court’s judgment. Appellant failed to appeal the judgment. Rather, appellant 
engages in conduct that he believes will burden the court and the clerk’s office in 
carrying out their official duties. 
In short, I am sure that everyone involved in this useless exercise, including 
appellant, could be using their time more efficiently and effectively. All of us 
have more important matters that require our attention. 
Id. at *5. 
 41. Id. at *4. 
 42. See QCONLINE.COM, supra note 1. 
 43. SPRINGFIELD, ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 37, art. II, § 37.19, (2016) (emphasis 
added). 
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applied, but the language does not give a citizen enough information to 
know whether his or her payment will be accepted.44 
III. VOID FOR VAGUENESS 
Because First-Amendment freedoms, like the freedom of speech, are 
fundamental personal rights, the law must safeguard these rights “to the 
ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that 
falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of education and 
discussion is essential to free government.”45 Accordingly, a law must be 
sufficiently clear to place individuals on notice of what they can or cannot 
do and that same law must not place excessively unfettered discretion in the 
hands of the governmental body applying the law.46 Stated another way, 
“[the void-for-vagueness] doctrine determines, in effect, to what extent the 
administration of public order can assume a form which, first, makes 
possible the deprivation sub silentio of the rights of particular citizens and, 
second, makes virtually inefficacious the federal judicial machinery 
established for the vindication of those rights.”47 
Although vagueness arguments are often coupled with overbreadth 
arguments, this article uses the terms interchangeably, in part, for 
convenience and, in part, because the two concepts address a common 
problem—laws that contain ambiguous language.48 Like overbreadth 
 
 44. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1875) (“If the legislature undertakes to 
define by statute a new offence, and provide for its punishment, it should express its will in 
language that need not deceive the common mind. Every man should be able to know with 
certainty when he is committing a crime.”). 
 45. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). 
 46. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (explaining that 
determining whether a statute is void for vagueness requires a two-fold investigation). 
 47. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 
67, 81 (1960). See also Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279 (2003). 
 48. See Samuel A. Terilli, Inartful Drafting Does Not Necessarily a Void, as Opposed to 
a Vague, Statute Make--Even under the First Amendment: The Eleventh Circuit Applies 
Common Sense to “Common Understanding” in Void-For-Vagueness Challenges to 
Lobbying Regulations, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 793 (2009). He writes: 
Although overbreadth and void-for-vagueness arguments often appear in tandem, 
as happened in FAPLI v. Division, this Article examines the Eleventh Circuit’s 
void-for-vagueness ruling only and is so limited because the issue of ambiguity 
lay at the heart of both arguments. The FAPLI appellants argued that the Florida 
lobbying laws, by virtue of their general definitions and structure, could not be 
understood as a matter of common knowledge and also could not, therefore, be 
narrowed to apply only to direct communications with covered state officials to 
influence state policy or legislation. Somewhat ironically, the appellants 
complained of vague standards under a law aimed at indirect as well as direct 
expenditures for lobbying as a way of maintaining their own ability to use vague 
396 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
challenges, void-for-vagueness challenges do not mean that laws with less-
than-artful drafting are always invalidated; rather, 
[u]nder the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose 
own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a 
statute on its face ‘because it also threatens others not before the court-
those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may 
refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have 
the law declared partially invalid.’
49
 
In criminal law, it is axiomatic that “[i]t is a basic principle of due 
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not 
clearly defined.”50 While the payment of a fine is not the same type of 
behavior as that which might constitute a crime, it is nonetheless behavior 
that should not be subject to arbitrary regulation because the failure to pay a 
fine could lead to criminal punishment. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has written, “[w]here a statute’s literal 
scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of 
reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [void-for-
vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other 
contexts.”51 Moreover, “[a] statute can be impermissibly vague for either of 
two independent reasons. First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it 
prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”52 A provision in an ordinance that gives the 
government the option to accept coins as payment of fines from some 
people and to refuse the same form of payment from others is clearly 
arbitrary and arguably not precise enough to pass muster under the U.S. 
Constitution. 
IV. 1983 LITIGATION 
If the Springfield City Clerk should refuse to accept coins pursuant to 
the new ordinance, the people who are not permitted to pay their fines with 
 
or indirect modes of influence upon or communication with government officials 
(i.e., by influencing government indirectly through the public and press). The 
overbreadth argument, therefore, shared the same root as the void-for-vagueness 
challenge-- ambiguous language. 
Id. at 795 (citations omitted). 
 49. Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) 
(quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985)). 
 50. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 51. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). 
 52. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 
56–57 (1999)). 
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coins should be able to sue the Clerk pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
violating their civil rights.53 This statute provides a civil remedy for 
violations of all “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws [of the United States].”54 “Thus, Section 1983 
provides a ‘broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil 
rights.’”55 
Under certain circumstances, however, a government official may 
escape Section 1983 liability because that official is entitled to “qualified 
immunity.”56 “An official sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified 
immunity, unless it is shown that the official violated a statutory or 
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged 
conduct.”57 In Barboza v. D’Agata, an assistant district attorney in Sullivan 
County, New York, determined that a citizen who had been issued a 
speeding ticket committed aggravated harassment when he defaced the 
ticket-payment form and also wrote profanity on the form.58 The assistant 
prosecutor conducted a minimal investigation into the circumstances 
surrounding the ticketed individual’s actions prior to setting in motion the 
events that ultimately led to the ticketed individual’s arrest.59 The arrestee 
sued the assistant prosecutor and others for violating his civil rights, and the 
attorney asserted that he had qualified immunity because of his office; 
however, the court disagreed.60 The court was absolutely clear: “[P]laintiff’s 
arrest violated his clearly established constitutional right to engage in and be 
free from arrests because of protected speech.”61 
 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2016). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Basham v. McBride, No. 5:04-cv-01335, 2008 WL 2595686, at *9 (S.D.W. Va. June 
26, 2008) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978)). See also 
Vickowski v. Hukowicz, 201 F. Supp. 2d 195, 198 (D. Mass. 2002) (former police officer 
unsuccessfully sought damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for alleged retaliation and 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment); Thomas v. 
Farmer, 573 F. Supp. 128, 129-30 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (court denies motion to dismiss a 1983 
action by a teacher who claimed that, because of a speech made by him at a board meeting, 
defendants had made defamatory statements about the teacher and attempted to have him 
suspended). 
 56. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity 
protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.’” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). 
 57. Barboza v. D’Agata, 151 F. Supp. 3d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Plumhoff v. 
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014)). 
 58. Barboza, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 367. 
 59. Id. at 367–68. 
 60. Id. at 375. 
 61. Id. 
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A city clerk who refuses to accept U.S. currency to pay a fine that is 
being paid with coins as a form of protest would likely find himself or 
herself in the very same position as the assistant prosecutor in Barboza.62 As 
this essay has demonstrated, payments to the government with U.S. coins 
are permitted by law and exercising free-speech rights is, without a doubt, a 
clearly-established constitutional right. As a consequence, it is doubtful that 
Springfield officials who refuse to accept coins for payment of a fine could 
escape liability through qualified immunity. 
In addition to a potential 1983 action against the Clerk, citizens who 
are not permitted to pay fines with coins may also have a cause of action 
against the City of Springfield. Municipal liability under Section 1983 is 
rarely allowed because Congress did not intend for municipalities to be 
liable under the statute unless the action is pursuant to an official municipal 
policy that caused a constitutional tort.63 As the Barboza court explained: 
Thus, to prevail on a claim against a municipality under Section 1983 
based on acts of a public official, a plaintiff is required to prove actions 
taken under color of law, deprivation of a constitutional or statutory 
right, causation, damages, and that an official policy of a municipality 
caused a constitutional injury.
64
 
In the matter of the City of Springfield’s ordinance, which appears to 
deny some citizens the opportunity to pay fines with U.S. coins, a plaintiff 
would have little difficulty demonstrating (1) that a clerk’s refusal to accept 
coins was under “color of law,” a “deprivation of a constitutional . . . right” 
to protest and (2) that the clerk’s actions were pursuant to an ordinance of 
the City of Springfield.65 Consequently, the City might be exposed to 
liability in addition to its municipal staff. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Freedom of speech, including speech that takes the form of protest, is 
one of the most cherished rights guaranteed to the citizens of the United 
States in the Constitution. There are times, however, when free-speech 
rights must give way to other rights and privileges or to the government’s 
 
 62. Id. at 367–68. 
 63. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“We conclude, therefore, 
that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its 
employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, 
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible 
under § 1983.”). 
 64. Barboza, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 376. 
 65. Id. 
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need to function in the interests of all citizens. When there is conflict, the 
courts have repeatedly held that the government may not limit speech unless 
the speech constitutes obscenity, child pornography, defamation, incitement 
to violence, or true threats of violence.66 
The payment of fines, taxes, or penalties to the government can provide 
an outlet for an unhappy citizen to express his or her dissatisfaction with 
government by making payment with coins instead of a check, paper 
currency, or credit card. That form of protest is protected speech and should 
not be abridged, particularly when the restriction on free speech is only 
because it inconveniences the government officials who will receive the 
payment. The U.S. Constitution does not condone such governmental 
infringement on a fundamental right, and the Springfield, Illinois ordinance 
that limits a citizen’s ability to pay the government with coins should be 
repealed. 
 
 66. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); United States v. Roth, 237 
F.2d 796, 799 (2nd Cir. 1956); Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 702 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
